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Introduction
In 1773, the Governor of Virginia voiced his concerns that he was
“‘forced to authorize the confinement of [persons with mental illnesses] . . .’ because of lack of appropriate services.”1 Over 200 years later,
the problem is still with us. In 2011, the guards at Central Prison in
Raleigh, North Carolina, held David Harold, a mentally ill inmate, naked in an isolation cell filled with feces and urine and denied him access
1.

Ctr. for Mental Health Servs., Building Bridges: Consumers and
Representatives of the Mental Health and Criminal Justice
Systems in Dialogue 3 (2005) (alterations in original).
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to medical or mental health treatment.2 Similarly, in 2012, the staff at
the Colorado State Penitentiary mistreated another man, a schizophrenic and psychotic inmate convicted of stealing a Buddha statue
worth $1,000 during a psychotic episode, by denying him access to
proper mental health treatment.3 This lack of treatment led to the
Colorado man’s sentence increasing from one to four years for the
resulting uncontrolled behavior.4 The 1773 Virginia Governor’s concerns and the plight of both men illustrate that the incarceration of and
inadequate care for people with mental illness in the American criminal
justice system is an issue that predates even the United States, and the
same problems—high recidivism rates and over-penalization, to name a
few—persist today.5
That state and federal prisons incarcerate nearly two million adults
with serious mental illness each year, often for terms far exceeding those
given to non-mentally ill adults who commit similar offenses, compounds these problems.6 Nearly sixteen percent of the total prison population is diagnosed with a severe mental illness, whereas only about
four percent of men and two percent of women in the general population
are diagnosed with similar mental illnesses.7 The difficulty of providing
adequate access to treatment contributes to these disproportionately

2.

Amanda Lamb, Father Says Central Prison Mistreated His Mentally Ill Son,
WRAL (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/10557210/
[https://perma.cc/YS98-324J].

3.

Kathy Brandt, In Prison with Schizophrenia and Psychosis, Kathy Brandt
Author (Mar. 28, 2013), http://kathybrandtauthor.com/mental-health/inprison-with-schizophrenia [https://perma.cc/UQR7-MX9B].

4.

Id.

5.

See Seth Jacob Prins & Laura Draper, Council of State
Governments Justice Center, Improving Outcomes for People
with Mental Illnesses Under Community Corrections Supervision:
A Guide to Research-Informed Policy and Practice 7 (2009)
[hereinafter Improving Outcomes] (suggesting that a lack of faith in
treatment resources, fear, and misconceptions regarding mental illness result
in disproportionately high delays in release and higher willingness in the
criminal justice system to force mentally ill offenders to serve the maximum
sentence allowed).

6.

Allison D. Redlich et al., Is Diversion Swift? Comparing Mental Health
Court and Traditional Criminal Justice Processing, 39 Crim. Just. & Behav.
420, 421 (2012) (noting that jail stays are “2.5 to 8 times longer” for mentally
ill inmates).

7.

Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus Project, Mental
Health Courts: A Primer for Policymakers and Practitioners
2 (2008) [hereinafter Mental Health Courts Primer].
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long prison terms for the mentally ill.8 Further, mentally ill prisoners
often lack the ability to consistently follow prison rules and orders,
exposing them to increased discipline.9 These factors, though, are more
related to mental illness than the actual crimes precipitating incarceration.10
In an effort to confront this problem in the late 1990s, states began
developing diversion opportunities to avoid disproportionate punishment.11 These opportunities came in the form of mental health courts.
And, by 2013, the mental health court system had expanded to over
340 mental health courts in forty-three states.12
While mental health courts have been generally successful in
reducing participant recidivism, increasing participant access to treatment, improving participant quality of life, and reducing government
costs,13 some scholars have questioned whether mental health courts’

8.

Position Statement 53: Mental Health Courts, Mental Health America
(Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/positions/mentalhealth-courts [https://perma.cc/8UUG-2MEN].

9.

Human Rights Watch, Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders
with Mental Illness 60 (2003). See also Redlich et al., supra note 6, at
421 (“[I]nfractions can lead to longer stays because of increased sanctions.”).

10.

See Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons
with Serious Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute
for Iowa, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1269, 1272 (2000) (noting that violence and mental
illness appear connected).

11.

Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 1; It is important to
note that some states attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish Mental Health
Courts in the 1980s, often considered the heart of the “deinstitutionalization”
era; however, despite the popular belief that most state psychiatric hospitals
closed in the 1970s and 1980s, “more . . . closed in the 1990s than in the
1970s and ’80s combined.” Risdon N. Slate et al., The Criminalization
of Mental Illness: Crisis and Opportunity for the Justice System
38–39 n.29 (2d ed. 2013). The increased deinstitutionalization in the 1990s
likely raised awareness for and heightened the need to address the plight of
the mentally ill in the criminal justice system, perhaps resulting in the more
successful establishment of Mental Health Courts during this later period.

12.

Beth Gilbert, The Use and Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts,
Psychiatry Advisor (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.psychiatryadvisor.com/
practice-management/the-use-and-effectiveness-of-mental-health-courts/
article/406221/ [https://perma.cc/NT5X-QVJC]; see Mental Health
Treatment Court Locators, Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Servs. Admin., http://www.samhsa.gov/gains-center/mental-healthtreatment-court-locators [https://perma.cc/A5NY-P7JC ] (last updated Aug.
19, 2015) [hereinafter GAINS Center Database] (compiling self-reported data
on the various Mental Health Courts across the United States); see generally
Slate et al., supra note 11, at 379–84 (describing the emergence and
proliferation of Mental Health Courts).

13.

See infra Part I.A.
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efficacy has come at too high a cost to participants’ liberty interests.14
The objective of this Note is to explore one of the espoused safeguards
to participant liberty: the requirement that participation in mental
health courts be voluntary. It suggests that, though structural and
clinical barriers may inhibit voluntariness in mental health court participation, adopting the consumer-participation model employed in some
private health treatment settings will improve mental health court
participants’ capacity for voluntary participation. Further, it suggests
that the improved voluntarism that the adoption of this model obtains
will help avoid several of the legal issues that mental health court opponents raise—conflicts with the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the informed consent doctrine.
For the purposes of this Note it is important to separate the voluntariness question from other important, related inquiries like competence and informed consent for treatment (a related but different inquiry). A competence adjudication is a preliminary (often presumed)
threshold requirement for all criminal defendants, including mental
health court participants.15 Generally, the court must determine that a
defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and . . . a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”16 On the
other hand, the informed consent inquiry, occurs at the point of clinical
treatment and requires that participants (1) be informed of the benefits,
risks, and alternatives to treatment; (2) understand those benefits,
risks, and alternatives; and (3) voluntarily consent to the treatment.17

14.

See, e.g., Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin’ Away? Will Our Nation’s Mental
Health Court Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?, 22
Quinnipiac L. Rev. 811, 853 (2004) (arguing that Mental Health Court
defendants “endure much more liberty restrictions and privacy intrusions”
and that labeling the “sentence ‘treatment,’ rather than ‘punishment,’”
allows the Court to exert more coercion over the participant than would
otherwise be available); Tammy Seltzer, Mental Health Courts: A Misguided
Attempt to Address the Criminal Justice System’s Unfair Treatment of
People with Mental Illnesses, 11 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 570, 574 (2005)
(arguing that the absence of voluntariness raises concerns regarding 14th
Amendment equal protection, 6th Amendment rights, and discrimination
prohibited under the ADA).

15.

See Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 5.

16.

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see also Council of State
Gov’ts, A Guide to Mental Health Court Design and Implementation 43 (2005) [hereinafter Guide to Design and Implementation]
(noting that this standard may vary across different states).

17.

See Jessica W. Berg et al., Informed Consent: Legal Theory and
Clinical Practice 65 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that the doctrine of informed
consent is comprised of “[t]he duty of disclosure, or the duty to inform, . . . [and] two other essential features: . . . understanding . . . [and]
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Though this inquiry may arise several times throughout the mental
health court process (i.e., when treatment strategies change), its scope
is relatively narrow—limiting voluntariness to only the point of treatment.18 Unlike competence and informed consent, the voluntariness
question is not confined to a specific time but continues throughout the
mental health court process as the defendant makes participation
choices, such as the decision not to withdraw.19 Further, even when a
defendant is competent and gives informed consent to treatment, issues
may still arise as to whether the defendant’s participation is voluntary—that is, whether the decision to participate is free of coercion and
made with the understanding of its consequences.20
Part I of this Note is a brief overview of the mental health court
system. It is broken into two subparts: first, a brief description of the
system’s goals and success; and, second, a brief overview of mental
health courts’ general structure. The theme here is that the term
“system” is really a misnomer, and there is plenty of room for development.
In Part II, I introduce some of the barriers to achieving voluntary
participation. This section also has two subparts: first, a discussion on
target participants’ reduced capacities; and, second, a description of the
structural shortcomings in mental health courts. The general theme here is that target participants do not suffer from a depreciated
decision-making capacity despite not having the tools to control their
illnesses. Instead, it suggests that participants have a reduced capacity
for voluntarism that can be improved through increasing education and
empowerment.
Finally, in Part III, I discuss the possible adoption of the consumerparticipation model from private mental health treatment as a tool for
improving access to information and reducing coercion in the mental
health court process. I suggest that this model will help alleviate some
of the problems with voluntariness in mental health court programs.
Further, I suggest that the benefits obtained from adopting the
consumer-participation model also address many of the concerns that
mental health court opponents raise.

voluntariness”). “Voluntariness,” here, is an “ill-defined” concept generally
meaning free of coercion. See id. at 67–70.
18.

Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 45.

19.

See id.; Seltzer, supra note 14, at 575.

20.

See John S. Goldkamp & Cheryl Irons-Guynn, Bureau of Justice
Assistance, Emerging Judicial Strategies for the Mentally
Ill in the Criminal Caseload: Mental Health Courts in Fort
Lauderdale, Seattle, San Bernardino, and Anchorage xi (2000)
(noting that voluntariness is difficult and important to safeguard and that
what is perceived as voluntary choices may actually be coerced).
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I. The Mental Health Court System
In order to understand the voluntarism discourse discussed in this
Note, it is necessary to understand the mental health court framework.
This section begins by discussing the purpose behind the development
of mental health courts as a tool for improving criminal justice outcomes for cases involving mentally ill offenders. This section then
addresses how mental health courts operate. Overall, this section illustrates that, while mental health courts appear to be achieving their
goals, there is significant need for development and standardization of
their practices—most importantly, improving the level of voluntary
participation.
A. The Goals and Successes of Mental Health Courts

The primary purpose of mental health courts is to provide better
outcomes for both the community and mentally ill offenders by reducing
the disproportionate incarceration of mentally ill offenders and connecting them to treatment resources.21 While mental health court practices
vary widely among jurisdictions,22 the Bureau of Justice Administration
recognizes four common goals geared toward the realization of this
primary purpose:
[1] Increased public safety . . . by . . . lowering the high recidivism rates for [mentally ill offenders];
[2] Increased treatment engagement by participants;
[3] Improved quality of life for participants; [and]
[4] More effective use of resources.23

Mental health court opponents, while recognizing that these goals
are paramount, believe that mental health courts are not the correct
avenue toward achieving those goals.24 Instead, they suggest that a
multitude of different changes in the criminal justice and mental health
systems would better achieve them.25 Still, mental health courts have

21.

See Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that
Mental Health Courts attempt to address the root cause of the behavior).

22.

See infra Part I.B.

23.

Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 8.

24.

See Seltzer, supra note 14, at 583 (stating that mental health courts “are
not the appropriate front door to access mental health care”).

25.

See id. at 584–86 (detailing fundamental flaws in mental health courts
that cannot be corrected and suggesting that mental health courts impede
the real root of the behavior from being addressed).
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been, and will likely continue, spreading as they appear to achieve these
goals.
Reducing the high recidivism rates among mentally ill offenders is
the top priority and measure of mental health court success.26 Studies
have shown that, among those who successfully graduate from mental
health court programs, recidivism rates and contacts with the criminal
justice system are significantly lower than the rates participants experienced before receiving treatment.27 Further, studies have also shown
that, when compared to mentally ill offenders who went through traditional processing, those who went through mental health court programs
had significantly lower recidivism rates.28 Though these studies use an
imperfect proxy to measure recidivism—post-treatment arrest rates29—
the reduction in arrest rates suggests that mental health courts have
been relatively successful in achieving the goal of reducing recidivism
among mentally ill offenders.
Much like with reducing recidivism rates, connecting mentally ill
offenders to treatment resources is among mental health courts’ top
priorities, largely because treatment helps reduce recidivism and results
in improved clinical outcomes in participants’ functioning.30 Linkage to
26.

See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Mental Health Court Performance Measures (2010) [hereinafter NCSC Brochure] (listing inprogram and post-program recidivism as the first and last among fourteen
measures of mental health court performance).

27.

See, e.g., Henry J. Steadman et al., Effect of Mental Health Courts on
Arrests and Jail Days: A Multistate Study, 68 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry
167, 167–68 (2011); Virginia A. Hiday & Bradley Ray, Arrests Two Years
After Exiting a Well-Established Mental Health Court, 61 Psychiatric
Servs. 463, 465 (2010) (finding that participants who completed the program
had lower recidivism rates than their pre-treatment rates sustained for two
years after ceasing court-mandated treatment and monitoring).

28.

See, e.g., Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Effectiveness of a Mental
Health Court in Reducing Criminal Recidivism and Violence, 164 Am. J.
Psychiatry 1395, 1401 (2007) (finding that, at eighteen months after
graduation from mental health courts, the rate of recidivism among
participants was roughly thirty-nine percent lower than the recidivism rate
among mentally ill persons in “treatment as usual” settings); Shelli B.
Rossman et al., Urban Inst., Criminal Justice Interventions for
Offenders with Mental Illness: Evaluation of Mental Health
Courts in Bronx and Brooklyn, New York 124 (2012) (finding that
recidivism rates among participants in the Bronx and Brooklyn mental
health courts were six to seventeen percentage points lower than recidivism
rates among nonparticipants in the same jurisdictions).

29.

This measure is imperfect because criminal recidivism may go unreported
or police may choose not to arrest. But cf. Seltzer, supra note 14, at 573
(suggesting that police are more likely to arrest a person with mental illness).

30.

See Improving Outcomes, supra note 5, at 22–27 (summarizing the results
from studies regarding community treatment programs’ effects on mentally ill
people’s criminal justice and clinical outcomes); see also NCSC Brochure,
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community treatment is accomplished in three ways: (1) encouragement
to continue with or return to previous treatment providers already
familiar with the participant, (2) judicial referrals to providers for the
staff’s recommended services after participant evaluations, and (3) providing general information or lists of providers to participants whose
cases are milder.31 This court-facilitated engagement with treatment
and court-mandated compliance with the treatment plan serve to improve access to mental health services after program entry.32 They also
increase treatment utilization in both incidence and volume for participants as compared to treatment utilization rates for mentally ill offenders in traditional processing.33 Despite this general success, opponents
are quick to point out that mental health courts are hindered, especially
in rural areas, because they rely on already available, finite community
treatment resources rather than creating new resources.34 Still, the strain caused when access to finite community-based mental health treatment resources seems preferable to the alternative: effectively cordoning
off treatment from people whose offense history illustrates their need
for it. Further, where community-based treatment is available, mental
health courts appear to have been successful in connecting participants
to it.
The last two goals’ accomplishment is part and parcel to that of
the first two: where recidivism is decreased and access to treatment is
increased, it follows that governmental and societal costs will go down
and quality of life for mental health court participants will increase.
Consistent with this concept and the studies reflecting decreased recidivism, studies have also shown that mental health court programs have
resulted in modest annual savings, mostly due to lower incarceration

supra note 26 (using participants’ connection to and participation in treatment
as two of the fourteen performance measures in mental health courts).
31.

Roger A. Boothroyd et al., The Broward Mental Health Court: Process,
Outcomes, and Service Utilization, 26 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 55, 59 (2003).

32.

See Karli J. Keator et al., The Impact of Treatment on the Public Safety
Outcomes of Mental Health Court Participants, 57 Am. Behav. Scientist
231, 232 (2013) (stating that Mental Health Courts “generally increase
participants’ access and utilization of community treatment”).

33.

See Boothroyd et al., supra note 31, at 63–67 (analyzing data collected from
two groups of individuals for an eight-month period following an appearance
in a mental health court).

34.

Slate et al., supra note 11, at 402. It is also problematic that increased
utilization of finite mental health treatment services results in “rationing
[that] may delay or even prevent intervention for . . . persons who are in need
of mental health services” but are not participants due to lack of illegal
activity. Id. at 404. A danger, here, is that non-offenders with restricted access
to treatment may suffer adverse outcomes and an increased propensity toward
criminal behavior—the very thing mental health courts are trying to combat.
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costs and larger governmental savings for both incarceration and treatment services over an extended period.35 Further, studies also suggest
that, in step with increased treatment access, mental health court
participants have an improved quality of life through improved functioning,36 fewer bookings and jail days,37 and greater perceived fairness
and respect for the criminal justice system.38 These decreased incarceration and treatment costs coupled with the improved functionality and
quality of life that mental health court participants experience suggest
that these programs are capable of meeting their goals to more efficiently use resources while also achieving higher-quality outcomes for mentally ill offenders.
Though these studies are limited by their narrow scope and the
difficulty in collecting data across a multitude of jurisdictions with diverse programs,39 their findings suggest that mental health courts are
capable of providing better outcomes. These improved outcomes reduce
the over-representation of the mentally ill in the criminal justice system
and increasing access to treatment resources—benefiting both mentally
ill offenders and the community at large.40 The next section will introduce the general structure and operation of mental health courts.

35.

M. Susan Ridgely et al., Rand Corp., Justice, Treatment, and
Cost: An Evaluation of the Fiscal Impact of Allegheny County
Mental Health Court 20 (2007) (finding that participants with more
severe cases of mental illness, low functioning, and criminal activity yielded
higher savings, though these savings were statistically “[in]significant in the
first year”). But cf. Rossman et al., supra note 28, at 127 (finding it
“prohibitively difficult to estimate the costs of regular MHC operations and
impossible to estimate the social costs of sanctions and treatment,” but
suggesting a model for future analysis).

36.

See, e.g., Merith Cosden et al., Evaluation of a Mental Health Treatment
Court with Assertive Community Treatment, 21 Behav. Sci. & L. 415, 424
(2003) (noting that mental health court patients “demonstrated improvements in life satisfaction, psychological distress, independent functioning, and
drug problems”).

37.

See, e.g., Steadman et al., supra note 27, at 170–72.

38.

See, e.g., Boothroyd, supra note 31, at 68 (finding that procedural fairness
increases while participants’ perceptions of coercion decrease). This perception
of fairness has important implications for mental health court effectiveness
because “when participants . . . view the mental health court process as
procedurally fair, they are more likely to be cooperative.” Slate et al.,
supra note 11, at 401.

39.

See Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that
mental health court studies tend to focus on individual programs or jurisdictional areas).

40.

Id. at 8.
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Though mental health courts are rapidly proliferating and have
enjoyed some success in their mission, they lack a standardized definition, largely due to their general status as “experimental” and due to
local differences in needs and resources.41 Still, the Bureau for Justice
Administration has pieced together the various commonalities among
mental health courts to create a generalized working definition:
[A] specialized court docket for . . . defendants with mental
illnesses . . . identified through mental health screening and
assessments and voluntarily participat[ing] in a judicially supervised treatment plan . . . [with i]ncentives reward[ing] adherence . . . and success . . . defined according to predetermined
criteria.42

This definition, in itself, illustrates several areas where ambiguity
exists regarding mental health court practices. This section discusses a
generalized picture of mental health court process, though some procedural and substantive inconsistencies exist across jurisdictions.
The mental health court process begins with a referral, which may
come from a multitude of sources: arresting officers, booking officers,
jail staff, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and even the defendant.43 At this stage, the referrer evaluates the offender for a number
of criteria—namely the criminal charge and a severe mental illness diagnosis.44 There is no uniform charge criterion across all mental health
41.

But see Gregory L. Acquaviva, Comment, Mental Health Courts: No Longer
Experimental, 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 971, 993–95 (2006) (recognizing the
“pilot model” status as the reason mental health courts still face problems).
See also Slate et al., supra note 11, at 395 (“There is no single model of
a mental health court that is suitable to all communities.”).

42.

Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 4 (emphasis added).

43.

Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 47; Council
of State Gov’ts Justice Center, Improving Responses to People
With Mental Illnesses: The Essential Elements of a Mental
Health Court 3 (2007); see, e.g., State Court Admin. Office,
Michigan Supreme Court, Developing and Implementing a Mental
Health Court in Michigan 8 (Aug. 2013); Missouri Thirteenth
Judicial Circuit Court, Introduction to Mental Health
Court 6, http://www.courts.mo.gov/hosted/circuit13/documents/ASC_
MCHPoliciesAndProceduresManual.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VVM-K9HG]
(last visited Jan. 29, 2016); York Cty., York Cty. Mental Health
Court Manual 4 (2005).

44.

Ursula Castellano & Leon Anderson, Mental Health Courts in America:
Promises and Challenges, 57 Am. Behav. Scientist 163, 164 (2013). While
these are the primary criteria considered by Mental Health Court referrers,
the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law suggests that an additional
criterion should be whether other diversion routes are available because “the
proper role [of Mental Health Courts] is to address the needs of those who
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courts: some restrict eligibility to offenders charged with misdemeanors,
many others restrict or extend eligibility to offenders charged with
felonies, and others use additional restrictive criteria, like requiring that
the charged crime be nonviolent.45 Likewise, there is no uniform diagnosis criterion.46 (Though many referrers and mental health courts use
a pre-referral severe mental illness diagnosis—typically along the lines
of schizophrenia, major depression, bipolar disorder, or other clinically
significant mental conditions—as a proxy for determining whether the
serious mental illness eligibility requirement is achieved.47) If the referrer believes the offender fits the appropriate criteria, she files a referral
form with the court for further processing.48
Following referral, the mental health court screens the candidate to
determine whether she is within the target population, gathers additional background information on the candidate, and makes a final

cannot [otherwise] be diverted without arrest or at pre-booking or arraignment, but for whom punishment through incarceration is not appropriate.”
Judge David L. Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, The Role
of Mental Health Courts in System Reform 5 (2004) [hereinafter
Bazelon Ctr. on The Role of Mental Health Courts].
45.

GAINS Center Database, supra note 12. Among reporting mental health
courts, twenty-four percent restrict participation to charged misdemeanants,
thirty percent restrict participation to charged felons, and forty-six percent
permit participation by both charged misdemeanants and felons. Four percent
of the courts allowing misdemeanant participation and thirty-six percent of
the courts allowing felon participation require the charged misdemeanor or
felony be non-violent.

46.

Cf. Castellano & Anderson, supra note 44, at 164 (discussing the variance
in “treatment modalities” and other processes across mental health courts
that may deal with different kind of “defendants, funding sources, and . . .
political and cultural climate[s]”).

47.

Id. (discussing the use of the DSM-IV diagnoses). A DSM-IV Axis I diagnosis
indicates a Clinical Mental Disorder. American Psychiatric Ass’n,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual on Mental Disorders 28 (4th
ed. 2000). This is defined as a “clinically significant behavior or psychological
syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with
present distress . . . or disability, . . . [though n]either deviant behavior . . .
nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are mental
disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in
the individual.” Id. at xxxi. Recently, the American Psychiatric Association
has developed the DSM-V, and this has generally replaced the use of
DSM-IV as a more accurate diagnostic tool. The difference here, however,
is immaterial—whichever manual diagnoses are based on, it serves as the
proxy for mental health court eligibility. For more information about DSMV, see American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual on Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013).

48.

See, e.g., Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 89
(providing a sample screening and referral form).

591

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015
Rehabilitation Through Empowerment

determination of eligibility.49 In addition to an evaluation regarding the
requisite charge and diagnosis, mental health courts also evaluate the
candidate for participation requirements, like legal competence,50 and
may require a guilty plea.51 If the court determines that the eligibility
requirements are fulfilled and the offender makes an informed, voluntary choice to participate, then he will become enrolled in the mental
health court.52
The next phase is split into two parts: staffing and status hearings.
During staffing, the court team—the judge, defense attorney, prosecutor, case manager, treatment provider, and other supervisory
agents—discusses and defines the defendant’s compliance, goals, and
treatment plan.53 The treatment plan often consists of several phases
marked by interim treatment goals like abstinence from substance
abuse, participation in designated therapy, and increased stability in
housing and financial arrangements.54 One of the more striking features
of staffing meetings in mental health courts is the changed roles for the
court officers involved. Judges leave the formal, neutral adjudicator role
and become deeply involved in planning, facilitating, and encouraging
treatment.55 Prosecutors abandon advocacy for punishment and seek to
forward treatment in the best interests of the defendant and the community.56 Defense attorneys abandon advocacy for the least restrictive
sentence and instead act as advisors to the court on how to attain
treatment goals while protecting the rights of their clients. And treatment professionals shift from not only providing care to also recommen-

49.

Id. at 48–51.

50.

Id. at 43. Generally, a defendant is competent if she “can understand the
legal situation and the proceedings and can also assist . . . her attorney in
the defense.” Id. If determined incompetent, the court may order certain
treatment or even civil commitment assessment. Faraci, supra note 14, at
828–29. It is important to note that having a severe mental illness does
not automatically render someone legally incompetent or insane. Slate
et al., supra note 11, at 301.

51.

See Seltzer, supra note 14, at 576 (“[H]alf [of the Mental Health Courts
studied by the Bazelon Center] required guilty or no-contest pleas as a
condition of participation.”). See also Position Statement 53: Mental Health
Courts, supra note 8 (opposing guilty pleas as a requirement for participation
in Mental Health Courts).

52.

Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 43.

53.

Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 7; see also, Guide to
Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 56, 61.

54.

See, e.g., York Cty., supra note 43, at 14–17 (dividing the treatment plan
into three six-month phases).

55.

Slate et al., supra note 11, at 388–91.

56.

Id.
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ding to the court whether advancement, rewards, or sanctions are appropriate.57 Most importantly, though, the participant is excluded from
these staffing meetings.
Following staffing, the court brings in the participant and conducts
nonadversarial status hearings to monitor participants’ compliance with
the plan and other participation requirements, to reward those who are
compliant, and to sanction those who are noncompliant.58 Through
these hearings, the court informs participants of the treatment plan and
goals for the period before the next status hearing. Although participants may be allowed to speak during these hearings, the plans and
goals are mandates created in the staffing meeting, and participants’
input during status hearings has little influence on them.59
The final step in the mental health court process is termination. If
the participant satisfactorily completes the phases of the program, she
moves on to graduation; however, if noncompliant, she will either continue participation until the phases are completed or be removed from
the program either by herself or the mental health court.60 Graduation
from the program often means that the charges against the participant
are dismissed or, if the court required a guilty plea for enrollment, that
the plea is dismissed or expunged.61 Expulsion or withdrawal, on the
other hand, typically results in the former participant being processed
through traditional court mechanisms, which can have important consequences like the use of information revealed in staffing and status
hearings or automatic conviction if the court required a guilty plea for
participation.62
57.

Id. at 390–91.

58.

Mental Health Courts Primer, supra note 7, at 7.

59.

Author’s Observations from the Juvenile Mental Health Court, Cuyahoga
County on February 9, 2015. Though processes in juvenile court and adult
court often differ, the staffing meetings and status hearings are present in
both juvenile and adult mental health courts. See, e.g., State Court
Admin. Office, Michigan Supreme Court, supra note 43, at 12
(discussing staffing meetings and status hearing reviews in the Michigan
mental health court system).

60.

Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 73–76.

61.

Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, supra note 44, at 8–10. While
over a third of the programs dismiss or expunge charges automatically, many
require the participant to request the dismissal or expungement, which can
take a substantial amount of time, during which the danger of relapse is
high due to complications in finding employment and housing with a
conviction record. Id. Because of this issue, the Bazelon Center recommends
that, where courts do require guilty pleas, those pleas be automatically
dismissed upon graduation. Id. at 9.

62.

Seltzer, supra note 14, at 575 (noting that about half of the courts permitted
withdrawal without prejudice within certain time restrictions, but most
put no restrictions on prosecutors’ use of information obtained through
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Since participation in these processes has important implications
for participants’ rights, all mental health courts include in their participation criteria the requirement that enrollment be voluntary. The
next section, and the remainder of this Note, is devoted to the voluntariness criterion and the consumer-participation model’s effect on it.

II. Barriers to Voluntariness in Mental Health
Court Participation
Despite the importance of voluntariness, significant barriers to
reaching it exist in the mental health court context. These barriers can
be split into two categories: first, some voluntariness problems may
arise due to participants’ diminished capacities stemming from their
mental illness; and, second, some structural issues also create roadblocks to voluntariness. This section discusses these barriers, finding
that a lack of voluntariness is not due to any immutable traits in mental
health patients, but is rooted in the current structure of mental health
courts. This structure, however, can be manipulated to improve
voluntariness.
A. Mental Health Court Participants’ Diminished
Capacities for Voluntariness

Serious concerns arise as to mental health court participants’
capacity to make voluntary decisions to participate as a result of their
clinical diagnoses—serious mental illnesses like schizophrenia, major depression, and bipolar disorder. One of the concerns is participants’
reduced decisional capacity. People with schizophrenia, for example, are
by definition afflicted with distorted perception and thought, characteristics vital to the decision-making process.63 Several studies have shown
that there is a correlation between schizophrenia and diminished
decision-making capacity, especially in regard to appreciation (understanding conditions and consequences).64 The results of similar studies
the defendant’s participation). The problems associated with guilty pleas
in graduation, withdrawal, and expulsion have led advocacy groups to
oppose the guilty plea as a requirement for enrollment. See, e.g., Position
Statement 53: Mental Health Courts, supra note 8; Bazelon Ctr. for
Mental Health Law, supra note 44, at 8–9.
63.

See William T. Carpenter et al., Decisional Capacity for Informed Consent in
Schizophrenia Research, 57 Archives of Gen. Psychiatry 533, 533 (2000).

64.

See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Decisional Capacity of Patients with
Schizophrenia to Consent to Research: Taking Stock, 32 Schizophrenia
Bull. 22, 22–23 (2006) (noting that a study has shown that people with
schizophrenia scored significantly worse on measures of understanding and
appreciation but not on reasoning or choice and concluding that a diagnosis
of schizophrenia does not per se indicate that a patient cannot competently
consent to research participation); Jeffrey A. Kovnick et al., Competence to
Consent to Research Among Long-Stay Inpatients with Chronic Schizophrenia,
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seem to indicate that people with severe depression also have impaired
decisional capacity.65 Further, even if a person with a severe mental
illness makes the decision to participate, this decision many not equate
to an ability to voluntarily carry out that decision.66
While these studies suggest that mental health courts’ target
participants may be less able to voluntarily participate due to diminished capacities for decision-making or voluntarism, this is not to say
that mental health court participants are necessarily incapable of
voluntary participation. First, people with severe mental illnesses generally have a range of cognitive and functional characteristics, allowing
many the ability to make decisions on a “normal” level.67 Second, many
of the deficiencies in decisional capacity may potentially be overcome
through adherence to medication regimens and education.68 The education that may be necessary for mental health court participants to
make a truly voluntary decision to participate touches upon the next
subsection’s topic: the structural barriers to voluntary participation in
mental health courts.
B. Structural Barriers to Voluntary Participation

As discussed above, education may improve mental health court
participants’ decision-making and voluntariness capacities. Still, many

54 Psychiatric Servs. 1247, 1247 (2003), http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/
doi/full/10.1176/appi.ps.54.9.1247 [https://perma.cc/SB3C-2FBD] (finding
a negative correlation between degree of illness and decisional capacity in
patients with schizophrenia); Carpenter, supra note 63, at 537. But see
Dilip V. Jeste et al., Magnitude of Impairment in Decisional Capacity in
People with Schizophrenia Compared to Normal Subjects: An Overview, 32
Schizophrenia Bull. 121, 126 (2006) (finding that, in four examined studies,
“a majority of people with schizophrenia was deemed to have adequate
decision-making capacity”). “Appreciation” is the ability to understand the
“effects of . . . participation (or failure to participate) on subjects’ own
situations,” Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Competence of Depressed Patients for
Consent to Research, 156 Am. J. of Psychiatry 1380, 1381 (1999), and/or
the ability to understand one’s own condition, Jeste et al., supra, at 121.
65.

See, e.g., Appelbaum et al., supra note 64, at 1381 (noting that the frequency
of such impairment and its relation to the degree of depression present
remain unclear).

66.

See Laura Weiss Roberts, Informed Consent and the Capacity for
Voluntarism, 159 Am. J. Psychiatry 705, 705 (2002) (distinguishing the
diminished capacity for voluntarism as from decisional capacity).

67.

See Jeste et al., supra note 64, at 126–27 (“Persons with schizophrenia
may be generally at risk for impaired decision-making capacity, yet such
impairment is not invariable.”).

68.

See Appelbaum, supra note 64, at 23 (noting that “educational intervention”
helped bring patients with schizophrenia “who scored poorly on understanding into the range of performance of the comparison group”).
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mental health courts have built-in structural barriers to educating participants regarding the processes and consequences of participation:
complexity caused by the changed roles of court officers and the exclusion of participants from treatment-planning.
While participants may find much of the information regarding
mental health court processes in their participation manuals,69 it is
incumbent upon defense counsel to explain this information to their
clients to help them determine whether mental health court participation is the most appropriate option.70 Several studies have shown,
however, that many mental health court participants are not even
aware that participation is optional, much less aware of its consequences.71 Some scholars blame this lack of understanding on the courts’
cursory inquiry into participants’ actual voluntariness;72 however, it
may be more deeply rooted in the complexity faced by defense attorneys. In the mental health court context, the defense attorney may be
uncomfortable shifting her concern from solely the patient’s rights to
considering factors outside the normal criminal case, such as clinical
options for treatment and medication.73 Still, this shortcoming can be
mitigated through the court requiring more explicit statements regarding participant choice, increased mental health training for the court
69.

See, e.g., Merrimack Cty/6th Circuit–Dist. Div.–Concord, Mental
Health Court Participant Manual (2011) (detailing mental health
court procedures).

70.

Guide to Design and Implementation, supra note 16, at 44.

71.

See Allison D. Redlich, Voluntary, but Knowing and Intelligent?
Comprehension in Mental Health Courts, 11 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L.
605, 610 (2005) (finding participants unaware of the voluntary nature of
mental health court participation in one mental health court); Norman G.
Poythress et al., Perceived Coercion and Procedural Justice in the Broward
Mental Health Court, 25 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 517, 530 (2002) (noting
that “a number of defendants reported that they were unaware that they
had a choice regarding their participation in the [mental health] court.”);
see also Alison D. Redlich & Alicia Summers, Voluntary, Knowing, and
Intelligent Pleas: Understanding the Plea Inquiry, 18 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y
& L. 626, 639 (2012) (finding that, though mental health court participants
understood that their plea was voluntary, the majority of participants
understood only sixty percent of the terms and consequences of that plea).

72.

See Poythress et al., supra note 71, at 530 (noting that, though the court
sometimes elicits explicit statements of assent from the defendant, many
times the court’s determination of consent is more implicit).

73.

See Seltzer, supra note 14, at 574 (noting that the complexities of mental
health courts may “undermine the defense attorney’s ability to assess the
prosecutor’s case and, thus, his or her ability to properly advise the client);
see also Slate et al, supra note 11, at 390–91 (“Defense attorneys are
often resistant to diversion, particularly for misdemeanors, because more
extensive probation may expose their clients to longer periods under control
of the criminal justice system.”).
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team, and other adjustments improving the dissemination of information to participants.74
Moreover, one of the most important processes in the mental health
court is conducted without participant input: determining the course of
treatment and goals. As discussed earlier in this Note, the court team
plans treatment and goals for the participant during the staffing
meeting, at which only the court team is present.75 This closed-doors
planning not only excludes the participant from making important clinical decisions, but also inhibits the dissemination of important information, such as the motivations behind the planning decisions and goals.
Further, these decisions are handed down to the participant as mandates regardless of whether the participant voices disagreement or concern about her ability to comply.76 Since this lack of inclusion avoids a
real dialogue between the court and the participant, the court misses
an opportunity to educate and empower the participant to fully understand the decision to comply. Further, since noncompliance is met with
drastic consequences—expulsion for noncompliance, for example, may
carry with it conviction if a guilty plea is required for enrollment77—
participants’ inability to shape these treatment decisions results in a
heightened degree of coercion. Here, excluding participants from treatment planning results in both coercion and a lack of understanding,
negating voluntariness.78
These structural barriers to information dissemination and participation inhibit the education necessary for mental health court participants to overcome their diminished capacities for voluntarily deciding
to participate. Still, these structural barriers can be manipulated to
increase voluntarism in mental health court participation and alleviate
74.

See Poythress et al., supra note 71, at 530 (noting that “making explicit
to defendants that they have a choice whether to remain in [the mental
health court] may further reduce perceived coercion”); Seltzer, supra note
14, at 576 (recommending that defense attorneys have “at their disposal
trained clinicians” to assist in making sure clients are properly informed).

75.

See supra Part I.B.

76.

See supra Part I.B.

77.

Guilty pleas are required by approximately half of Mental Health Courts.
Bazelon Ctr. on The Role of Mental Health Courts, supra note
44, at 8; see Patricia A. Griffin et al., The Use of Criminal Charges and
Sanctions in Mental Health Courts, 53 Psychiatric Servs. 1285, 1286
(2002), http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176/appi.ps.53.10.1285
[https://perma.cc/4BQR-R5VD] (noting specific courts that require guilty
pleas for access to Mental Health Courts); see also Guide to Design and
Implementation, supra note 16, at 38 (citing Council of State Gov’ts,
Mental Health Courts Program 2 (2003)) (Roughly forty percent of
the Mental Health Courts studied required a guilty plea by all participants,
while slightly more required a guilty plea from at least some participants.).

78.

Voluntary participation requires a lack of coercion and an understanding
of the decision and its consequences. See supra Introduction.
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some of the legal concerns raised by mental health court opponents.
The next section considers the consumer-participation model, the implementation of which would allow for the increased dissemination of
information necessary for voluntary participation.

III. The Consumer-Participation Model for
Mental Health Courts
If the main obstacle for voluntariness is the insufficiency of information necessary for defendants to voluntarily participate, the solution
must be a system change capable of disseminating this vital information. One method for ensuring that information is available to mental
health court participants is taking the treatment and goals planning
process out from behind closed doors to include the participant: the
consumer-participation model. This section proposes that mental health
courts will benefit by incorporating the consumer-participation model
for clinical mental health treatment. Adopting this model will improve
the level of voluntariness through participants’ access to information
and, in doing so, address many of the legal concerns that mental health
court opponents field.
A. The Consumer-Participation Model and Improved
Access to Information

Consumer-participation models for mental health services emerged
in the 1970s, when activists reacted against the marginalization of
mental health patients in clinical settings and advocated for an increased level of control and responsibility for the patient over her own life.79
Scholars have identified three types of consumer-participation models:
(1) individual discussion and engagement as part of the decision-making
process, (2) participation on the organizational level, and (3) active
involvement with the community’s planning and policy decisionmaking.80 This Note recommends that mental health courts adopt the
first type, which emphasizes individual choice and exposes individuals
to a range of information and opportunities for treatment.81
Hickey & Kipping call the individual level consumer-participation
model “user involvement” and identify four levels on the continuum of

79.

Nora Jacobson & Laurie Curtis, Recovery as Policy in Mental Health
Services: Strategies Emerging from the States, 23 Psychiatric Rehab. J.
333, 333–34 (2000).

80.

Margaret Tobin et al., Consumer Participation in Mental Health Services:
Who Wants It and Why?, 25 Australian Health Rev. 91, 92 (2002).

81.

Jacobson & Curtis, supra note 79, at 335.
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participation.82 The base level is information/explanation, in which the
individual is given a higher degree of information regarding the motivations behind the decisions but has no decisional authority.83 The
second level is consultation, in which the decision-makers gather input
from the participant but still retain all the decisional authority.84 The
third level, partnership, would go a step further and split decisional
authority equally between the treatment supervisors and the participant.85 Finally, the fourth level gives the ultimate decisional authority
regarding treatment to the participant.86
Mental health courts ought to adopt something between the
consultation and partnership levels. The first two levels—information/
explanation and consultation—would only slightly improve the level of
participation and do little to negate mental health courts’ coercive
elements because there would be no shift in decisional authority. On
the other hand, the partnership and user-control levels create too great
a power-shift and would undermine the court’s authority, inviting
increased criticism from retributivists. Instead, a middle level of user
involvement, a gradual increase in limited deference to participant
choice with the court team retaining the ultimate choice, is appropriate.
This mid-level approach would avoid the court genuflecting to participants’ will while still allowing participants to assent or dissent to the
proposed treatment plan.87 Further, it would allow for adjustments as
participants’ decisional-capacity increases through participation.
Adopting this mid-level of the user involvement consumer-participation model would increase the level of voluntariness in mental health
courts through increased information and reduced coercion. The access
to information would be improved almost as a matter of course because,
instead of being shut out of the treatment planning process,88 the
participant would become an integral part of that process. As a part of
that process, the participant would become privy to the discussions and
82.

Gary Hickey & Cheryl Kipping, Exploring the Concept of User Involvement
in Mental Health Through a Participation Continuum, 7 J. Clinical
Nursing 83, 84–85 (1998).

83.

Id. at 85.

84.

Id.

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

See Fred C. Osher & Iren S. Levine, Bureau of Justice Assistance,
Navigating the Mental Health Maze: A Guide for Court Practitioners 18 (2005) (“Full consumer approval in the court process is not
warranted, but soliciting defendant input and offering choices among
treatment options can improve both short-term compliance and longterm outcomes.”).

88.

See supra Part I.B.
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motivations behind certain treatment proposals as well as different
options for which she could voice her preference. On the other hand,
coercion would decrease because, instead of allowing “defense counsel
and/or the court [to] make decisions . . . [even though the participant]
is thoroughly confused and afraid,”89 the court team would be forced to
help alleviate participant confusion and consider a participant’s input.
Since improving voluntariness requires a reduction in coercion and an
improvement in understanding,90 adopting this mid-level model of the
user involvement consumer-participation model would improve the
level of voluntariness in mental health court participation.
This manipulation to the structural barriers to voluntary participation would also help reduce the clinical barriers to voluntary
participation. As discussed above, the key clinical barrier to voluntary
participation is mental health court participants’ diminished decisional
and voluntarism capacities.91 Not only will the structural change caused
by adopting the consumer-participation model allow opportunities for
education regarding the decision to participate,92 but also the empowerment that participants experience through increasing their involvement
will have its own benefits. One of the problems causing participants’
diminished capacities is that people with severe mental illnesses are
often “conditioned to be compliant and often come to believe they are
powerless.”93 Combating both perceived and actual powerlessness through increasing choice and control helps mental health patients develop
stronger decision-making and cognitive abilities, including realizing and
achieving personal goals.94 Further, empowerment helps participants
recognize their self-worth, which is necessary to confront the stigmatization of mental illness, a factor contributing to decompensation.95
Through empowerment, the use of the consumer-participation model in
mental health courts will help overcome the barriers to voluntary
89.

Faraci, supra note 14, at 846–47.

90.

See supra Introduction.

91.

See supra Part II.A.

92.

See supra Part III.A.

93.

Geoffrey Nelson et al., Empowerment and Mental Health in Community:
Narratives of Psychiatric Consumer/Survivors, 11 J. Community &
Applied Soc. Psychol. 125, 126 (2001).

94.

See id. at 126–27.

95.

See E. Sally Rogers et al., A Consumer-Constructed Scale to Measure
Empowerment Among Users of Mental Health Services, 48 Psychiatric
Servs. 1042, 1043 (1997) (discussing methods for measuring empowerment);
Improving Outcomes, supra note 5, at 16 (noting probationers with mental
illness perceived themselves as “needy and time-consuming,” reflecting a low
self-worth). Decompensation is the “failure of defense mechanisms such as
occurs in initial and subsequent episodes of acute mental illness.” Taber’s
Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 586 (Donald Venes ed., 21st ed. 2009).
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participation caused by participant’s diminished capacities for decisionmaking and voluntarism.
Since the beginning level of involvement is unaffected by consumerparticipation and its benefits are not realized until after enrollment,
adopting this model may open the door for opponents to argue that this
model would not improve voluntariness at the enrollment stage. Indeed,
many opponents and supporters have recognized that true voluntariness
is unlikely at the early stages and advocate for one important safeguard:
the right to withdraw without prejudice.96 This right allows for participants to reach back in time and elect a traditional adjudicatory path
(with all its constitutional safeguards) if they find that they cannot
comply with or fully participate in the mental health court.97 This Note
supports a more widespread adoption of this withdrawal right;98 however, the right to withdraw’s potential cannot be realized without giving
participants greater education on its existence and consequences and
empowering them to invoke it. In this manner, the right to withdraw is
enhanced by adopting the consumer-participation model because it
would help ensure that the decision to invoke or to not invoke the right
is made with an improved level of information and decision-making
capacity.99
The consumer-participation model focuses on two of the keys to
improving decision-making and voluntariness capacities in people with
mental illnesses: education and empowerment.100 Since the adoption of
a consumer-participation model using mid-level user involvement would
help improve the dissemination of information, reduce coercion, and
empower participants to make choices regarding their treatment and
participation, the adoption of this model would help improve participants’ capacities for voluntariness in mental health courts.

96.

See Seltzer, supra note 14, at 575 (discussing the importance of the right to
withdraw from mental health court participation); Position Statement 53:
Mental Health Courts, supra note 8 (noting that voluntary participation is
key aspect of mental health courts).

97.

Seltzer, supra note 14, at 575.

98.

Only roughly half of the reporting mental health courts included the right
to withdraw. Id.

99.

There still may be other barriers to invoking the right to withdraw, such
as time limits or plea requirements, but a full discussion on these barriers
is outside the scope of this paper. I agree with Seltzer and the MHA that
these barriers should be lifted. See id. (discussing the importance of the
right to withdraw); Position Statement 53: Mental Health Courts, supra
note 8 (noting ways to avoid coercion in mental health courts).

100. See supra Part II.A. (citing Paul S. Appelbaum, Decisional Capacity of
Patients with Schizophrenia to Consent to Research: Taking Stock, 32
Schizophrenia Bull. 22, 23 (2006)).
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Still, even if voluntarism is improved, the adoption of the consumerparticipation model would be of little use if opponents are able to
succeed in dismantling the mental health court system by arguing that
it trammels participants’ rights. The next subsection will address how
improving the level of voluntariness will affect these mental health court
opponents’ legal arguments.
B. Consumer-Participation’s Effect on Opponents’ Legal and Practical
Arguments Against Mental Health Courts

While increasing mental health courts’ level of voluntary participation through adopting the consumer-participation model has its own
benefits to the legitimacy of mental health courts, it has the added
benefit of addressing many of the legal and practical issues that opponents raise.101 As discussed above, adopting the consumer-participation
model will allow for a greater flow of information because it facilitates
a higher level of communication between court teams and participants,
who are no longer locked outside the court’s planning. This heightened
communication will help ensure that participants have access to the
resources necessary to understand their rights, waivers, and the consequences of their decisions.
1. Constitutional Issues

Many opponents suggest that mental health court participation
conflicts with defendants’ constitutional rights, namely the right to a
jury and the right to counsel.102 While participation likely does impact
these rights, adopting the consumer-participation model will help avoid
violations because it will help ensure that participants are informed in
waiving them.
First, mental health courts using the consumer-participation model
may improve the capacity for participants to understand and waive
their jury trial right. Opponents argue that mental health court participation conflicts with the right to a jury trial,103 which is especially
101. The legal issues discussed in this Note are concerned with federal
constitutional standards and federal statutes applicable to the states, though
state standards may also apply to Mental Health Courts.
102. Seltzer, supra note 14, at 574. Opponents often also raise concerns regarding
equal protection. Id. However, the equal protection argument would likely fall
on rational basis scrutiny because improving rehabilitation and reducing
adverse prison populations is likely a legitimate state interest. See generally
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (limiting the courts’
inquiry into laws affecting mentally disabled persons to rational basis “with
bite” scrutiny).
103. Faraci, supra note 14, at 839; see, e.g., Cty. of Skagit, Sup. Ct. of Wash.,
Agreement, Waiver and Statement of Defendant on Submittal or Stipulation
of Facts and Order to Participate in Mental Health Court, http://www.
skagitcounty.net/SuperiorCourt/Documents/MHC/Stipulation%20and%
20Order%20to%20Participate%20in%20MHC.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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important where the participant is charged with a serious crime, such
as a high misdemeanor or a felony.104 This right, established by the
Sixth Amendment and extended to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment,105 provides that “the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”106 Still, it may be waived
under certain circumstances,107 and courts have ruled that this waiver
must be “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”108 In other words, the
defendant must have access to enough information and understanding
regarding this right, and his waiver must be free of coercion.109
Assuming that mental health courts implement the right to withdraw without prejudice as briefly discussed above,110 adopting the
consumer-participation model would help ensure that participants have
greater access to the court team, thereby increasing their access to
information regarding the jury trial right. Here, since not exercising the
right to withdraw would be almost a continuous waiver of that right,
the increased access to information resources through improved involvement and communication would help participants make these continuous waivers with greater understanding.
Similarly, mental health courts using the consumer-participation
model may improve the capacity for participants to waive conflicts with
their right to counsel. While mental health courts do not require participants to abandon this right,111 problems may arise due to the different
role the defense attorney must take on as a contributing member of a

Y66Q-8NR6] (requiring the waiver of a jury trial right as part of the enrollment
form).
104. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 324 (1996) (ruling that there is no
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial for some lesser offenses).
105. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963).
106. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
107. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26 (1965) (recognizing that
limitations, such as requiring the waiver to be in writing, are permissible
because “the ability to waive a jury trial [is not] of equal importance to
the right to demand one”).
108. Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 2002). This requirement is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s requirements for waiving other rights
of the accused. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)
(ruling that the waiver of Miranda rights must be “voluntary in the sense
that it was . . . a free and deliberate choice . . . [and] made with a full
awareness of . . . the right being abandoned and the consequences”).
109. Spytma, 313 F.3d at 370.
110. See supra Part III.A.
111. See Seltzer, supra note 14, at 574 (noting that defense attorneys perform
a crucial role in Mental Health Courts by informing participants of the
consequences of participation and their options).
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non-adversarial treatment team.112 While some scholars have classified
this altered role as creating a “competing set of loyalties” giving rise to
a conflict of interest,113 it seems unlikely that an actual conflict of
interest arises because this altered role neither changes the defense
attorney’s pecuniary interests nor diverts his attention from the best
interests of his client.114 Instead, the mental health court defense
attorney simply must work to achieve what is best for his client in
cooperation with the other members of the team, rather than advocate
for what would be considered the “best deal” in more traditional settings.115 This represents more of a shift in the defendant’s interests rather
than the creation of conflicting interests for the defense attorney.
The more likely danger inherent in defense attorneys’ shifting roles
is to the attorney-client privilege.116 Though this privilege is not itself a
constitutional doctrine,117 it is part and parcel to the execution of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.118 Since defense attorneys may need
to reveal potentially privileged information that could be used against
participants who withdraw and return to the traditional process, it is
imperative that they reveal this risk as part of the duty to ensure that
their clients understand the possible consequences of participation.119
As discussed above, the participant in the consumer-participation model would have access to the discussions in which these revelations are
normally made, so using this model will help attorneys “manage [the]

112. Faraci, supra note 14, at 844.
113. Id. (quoting Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug
Treatment Court Movement, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 1205, 1213 (1998)).
114. The standard here is that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel carries with
it “a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest,”
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981), which is violated when “the
attorney could have pursued a plausible alternative [to a problematic course
of action, but it was] not undertaken due to the attorney’s other interests or
loyalties.” Bucuvalas v. United States, 98 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1996).
115. Christin E. Keele, Note, Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: The Challenging
Role of the Defense Attorney in the Mental Health Court System, 71 U.
Mo. Kan. City L. Rev. 193, 206 (2002).
116. See Roger C. Park et al., Evidence Law: A Student’s Guide to
the Law of Evidence as Applied in American Trials 439 (3d ed. 2011)
(noting that most states have adopted this privilege either by statute or in
common law).
117. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 n.15 (1975).
118. See Michael B. Dashjian, People v. Meredith: The Attorney-Client Privilege
and the Criminal Defendant’s Constitutional Rights, 70 Calif. L. Rev.
1048, 1050 (1982) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is an essential
part of protecting defendants’ fifth and sixth amendment rights).
119. Seltzer, supra note 14, at 574.
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clash of expectations and responsibilities” through the participant’s own
observations and increased access to information.120
Because adopting the consumer-participation model for the mental
health court setting would result in an increased flow of information
and inclusion in the processes, it is likely that participants would have
a better understanding and ability to exercise or waive their rights to
a jury trial and the attorney-client privilege.
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act

In addition to the constitutional issues, opponents suggest that
mental health court participation may violate Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act’s (ADA) “prohibition against discrimination by a
state program.”121 This prohibition provides that: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.”122
Under this prohibition, states cannot require defendants to
completely abdicate their access to the traditional court system.123 Here,
participants’ understanding that they can withdraw from the mental
health court system to return the traditional court system plays a vital
role in protecting this access.124 This remains true even if mental health
courts are couched as an accommodation under the ADA, as some scholars have suggested.125 This is because states cannot use their duty to
accommodate as an excuse for “fail[ing] to provide individuals with a
meaningful right of access to the courts.”126 This access, however, may
120. Faraci, supra note 14, at 844.
121. Seltzer, supra note 14, at 574.
122. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
123. See Ronda Cress et al., Mental Health Courts and Title II of the ADA:
Accessibility to State Court Systems for Individuals with Mental Disabilities
and the Need for Diversion, 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 307, 345 (2006)
(“[A] public entity, such as a state’s judicial system, cannot require an
individual with a mental disability to accept diversion into a mental health
court if he or she wants to participate in the mainstream state courts . . . .”).
124. Id. at 343 (arguing that “so long as individuals who are diverted into
[mental health courts] still have the option to participate in the ‘regular’
court system,” mental health courts can “pass muster under the ADA”).
125. Id. at 347 (“[M]ental [H]ealth [C]ourts are arguably necessary to bring the
state[s’] court system[s] into compliance with the ADA.”).
126. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004). See also Dept. of Justice,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title VII Technical
Assistance Manual II-3.4300 (1993), http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html
[https://perma.cc/MN34-BRNJ] (suggesting that defendants “may not be
required to accept [participation] if they choose not to do so”).
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be hindered if participants lack the knowledge necessary to understand
their ability to elect traditional court processing.127 The increased access
to information and the improved decisional capacities created through
adopting the consumer-participation model will help ensure that participation comes without denying access to traditional court process, improving compliance with the ADA.128
3. Informed Consent

Finally, incorporating the consumer-participation model for treatment planning in mental health courts may avoid conflicts with the
doctrine of informed consent. This doctrine requires that patients
choose their treatment with an “understanding of alternatives to and
risks of the therapy.”129 The fulfillment of this standard is tripartite: (1)
the participant is informed, (2) the participant understands, and (3)
the participant voluntarily consents to the treatment.130
Although mental health courts may be able to forgo informed
consent by asserting the exception available when a valid court order
authorizes treatment,131 adopting the consumer-participation model
may be a less polemical approach.
As discussed above, the consumer-participation model will help achieve the information element of informed consent. As user involvement
in discussion and decision-making increases, participants are exposed to
a higher degree of information regarding the motivations behind and
potential consequences of treatment.132
Additionally, the consumer-participation model will help achieve
the understanding element through an increase in participants’ cognitive abilities. As discussed above, one of the key factors in increasing
the understanding of people with mental illnesses is improving edu-

127. See Allison D. Redlich et al., Enrollment in Mental Health Courts:
Voluntariness, Knowingness, and Adjudicative Competence, 34 Law &
Hum. Behav. 91, 92 (2010) (“[C]lients who claimed not to know they had
a choice in enrolling [and withdrawing] had significantly higher perceived
coercion scores than those claiming to be aware.”).
128. Compare supra Part III.A. (discussing the improved access to information
and decisional capacities created through the consumer-participation
model), with Redlich et al., supra note 127, at 93 (suggesting that mentally
ill offenders are “known to have deficits in legal comprehension” and are
“under significant stress and instability,” such that they will have trouble
making a knowing and intelligent decision).
129. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
130. See Berg et al., supra note 17, at 65 (discussing the components of the
informed consent).
131. Id. at 90–91.
132. Supra Part III.A.
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cation. Therefore, the increased education that participants gain through the consumer-participation model will help increase their ability to
understand the information they receive and decisions they make.
Finally, it will improve the chances that participants will voluntarily consent to treatment to meet the third prong of informed consent.
First, the consumer-participation model’s improvement of information
dissemination will help participants gain the education necessary for
enhanced voluntarism. Second, rather than allowing the court to simply
issue orders declaring the treatment that participants must comply
with, participants will be able to articulate their points of view and
affect treatment decisions. Coupling both enhancement of voluntarism
capacities and allowing participants to use those enhanced capacities
by articulating their own views will help empower participants to
voluntarily consent to treatment in mental health courts.
Since the heightened involvement and access to information resources involved in implementing the consumer-participation model will
help address mental health court opponents’ legal concerns, adopting
the consumer-participation model has an additional layer of attraction
beyond just improving the level of voluntariness in participation.

Conclusion
Although mental health courts have been generally successful in
improving the disproportionate incarceration and over-punishment of
mentally ill offenders, their status as voluntary diversion programs has
come under opponents’ criticism. Adopting a consumer-participation
model to bring treatment-planning out from behind closed doors by
involving participants will help improve participants’ access to information and understanding and reduce the coerciveness of treatment mandates. Further, since this increased involvement will facilitate greater
communication between mental health court participants and the court
team, the consumer-participation model will help address many other
arguments that opponents have fielded. Although a full realization of
the consumer-participation model’s benefits may hinge on the coavailability of a right to withdraw (a full discussion of which was outside the purview of this Note), it is nonetheless an important opportunity for improving the structural and clinical barriers to voluntariness in
mental health court participation.
McDaniel M. Kelly†

†

J.D. Candidate 2016, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I
would like to thank Dean B. Jessie Hill and Professor Laura McNally for
their support and guidance through this process, Ellesha LeCluyse for her
comments and criticisms, and, of course, my family and friends upon whom
I lean daily.

607

